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Flexible Access Control to JPEG 2000
Image Code-Streams
Yongdong Wu, Di Ma, and Robert H. Deng
Abstract—JPEG 2000 is an international standard for still image
compression in the 21st century. Part 8 of the standard, named
JPSEC, is concerned with all the security aspects, in particular to
access control and authentication. This paper presents a novel ac-
cess control scheme for JPEG 2000 image code-streams. The pro-
posed scheme is secure against collusion attacks and highly effi-
cient. The scheme is also very flexible, allowing access control to
JPEG 2000 image code-streams according to any combination of
resolution, quality layer and region of interest. The “encrypt once,
decrypt many ways” property of our scheme is designed to work
seamlessly with the “compress once, decompress many ways” fea-
ture of the JPEG 2000 image code-streams. Our prototype imple-
mentation shows that the scheme is practical and is completely
compatible with the core part of the JPEG 2000 standard.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE OF THE well-known image compression standards isJPEG. JPEG stands for Joint Photographic Experts Group,
a community of experts that was formed under the auspices of
the ISO in the mid-1980s to develop a standard for still image
coding. Since then, an evolution of image compression tech-
nology has taken place and a much more superior image com-
pression standard known as JPEG 2000 has been formed re-
cently by ISO/IEC JTC/SC29/WG1 (the working group charged
with the development of JPEG 2000 standard). The major in-
tention of JPEG 2000 is twofold [1], [2]. First, it is designed
to address most of the limitations of the original JPEG stan-
dard. Secondly, it intends to cater for the widening of application
areas for JPEG technology. In addition to excellent coding per-
formance and good error resilience, a remarkable merit of JPEG
2000 is its “compress once, decompress many ways” function-
ality, i.e., it supports extraction of images with different resolu-
tions, quality layers and regions-of-interest (ROIs), all from the
same compressed code-stream. This functionality allows appli-
cations to manipulate or disclose only the required image data
of a code-stream for any target users based on their privileges or
capabilities. JPEG 2000 achieves “compress once, decompress
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many ways” by encoding and organizing code-streams in a com-
plicated but systematic way.
JPEG 2000 refers to all parts of the standard: Part 1 (the core)
[3] specifies the coding technology and is now published as an
international standard, while other parts extends Part 1. In par-
ticular, Part 8 of the standard, named JPSEC [4], is concerned
with all the security aspects of JPEG 2000 image code-streams.
It includes a normative part and an informative part. The nor-
mative part defines the protection syntax such as encryption
template, authentication template and protected region called
as ZOI (Zone of Influence) for inter-operability, while the in-
formative part presents ten tools which are compliant with the
normative part.
As one of the informative tools in JPSEC, the technique pre-
sented in this paper is an access control scheme for JPEG 2000
image code-streams based on cryptographic techniques. The
challenge in the design of the access control scheme is to strike a
delicate balance among security, efficiency and flexibility. Mo-
tivated by the work of Sandhu [5], we construct a novel rooted
tree based on the inherent structure and property of JPEG 2000
image code-streams. We use the tree to generate a family of
keys to encrypt code-stream packets in such a manner that only
users with the right security clearance can decrypt the encrypted
packets corresponding to the requested/granted image. The pro-
posed scheme is secure against unauthorized access as well as
collusion attacks. It is also efficient since only one-way hash
function and symmetric key encryption are used. More impor-
tantly, the scheme is extremely flexible, allowing access con-
trol to JPEG 2000 image code-streams according to any com-
bination of resolution, quality layer and WOI (Window-of-In-
terest).1 This “encrypt once, decrypt many ways” property of
our scheme is designed to be completely compatible with the
“compress once, decompress many ways” feature of the JPEG
2000 image code-streams.
A. Related Work
Access control involves authorizing legitimate users with ap-
propriate privileges to access a certain resource while denying
access from illegal users [6], [7]. Solutions for authorization
fall into two categories, access control models and crypto-
graphic techniques. An access control model mediates access
to resources by checking with access control rules established
in conformance with a security policy. A cryptographic method
for access control manages authorization by encrypting infor-
mation items such that only authorized users have the right
1According to JPEG 2000 specification [3], ROI (Region-of-Interest) in a
code-stream is defined explicitly by the image owner. Thus, we use WOI to
indicate the region which the client is interested in.
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keys to decrypt the scrambled data. A number of schemes
[8]–[12] relating to access control based on cryptographic
techniques have been proposed. All of these schemes assume
that information items as well as users are classified into a
certain type of hierarchy and there is a relationship between
the encryption key assigned to a node and those assigned to
its children. The related work differs mostly in the different
cryptographic techniques employed for key generation. Most
of them employ complex and computational expensive crypto-
graphic operations, such as RSA [13] or large integer modular
exponentiations. Employing these schemes in access control
to JPEG 2000 image code-streams is not feasible since user
devices (such as PDAs and cell phones) in JPEG 2000 applica-
tions can be very resource constrained.
Since a JPEG 2000 packet is identified uniquely by a given
resolution-increment (or resolution), a layer-increment (or
layer) a precinct, a component and a tile, a straightforward
solution is to encrypt each packet with an independent key.
This trivial access solution provides great flexibility at the
price of a large overhead for key communication and storage.
For instance, the JPEG 2000 standard allows a code-stream
to support up to ,
and large number of precincts. Consider a 1024 1024
image generated by a digital camera and assume that it is
processed with 5-resolutions, 16 layers, and 16 precincts. For
access to a tile-component, the number of required keys is
in the trial solution.
Grosbois et al. [14] proposed two access control schemes for
JPEG 2000 image code-streams. The first scheme allows for
a preview of low resolution image while preventing the cor-
rect display of its higher resolutions by scrambling the sign bits
of the wavelet coefficients of the high resolutions code-block
by code-block based on pseudo-random sequences. The second
scheme provides access control to image quality layers by in-
troducing pseudo-random noise in the higher quality layers of
the image. Random seeds for generating the pseudo-random
sequences are encrypted and appended to image code blocks.
However, the two schemes in [14] have several drawbacks. First,
they are not flexible, providing either resolution based access
control or quality layer based access control but not both at the
same time. Secondly, they introduce considerable overhead to
the image code-stream. For instance, assume that a 1024 1024
medium size image with 256 (64 64) code-blocks, the pay-
load for the encrypted seeds amounts to
assuming that each seed consists of 16 bytes (128 bits). Thirdly,
the two schemes lead to decreased compression ratio because
wavelet coefficients are randomized before compression.
The Secure Scalable Streaming (SSS) technique proposed in
[15] supports low complexity, high quality transcoding at in-
termediate, possibly untrusted, network nodes without compro-
mising the end-to-end security of the system. SSS encodes, en-
crypts, and packetizes video into secure scalable packets in a
manner that allows transcoders to perform transcoding oper-
ations (e.g., bit rate reduction and spatial down sampling) by
simply truncating or discarding packets, and without decrypting
the data. Secure scalable packets have unencrypted headers that
provide side information, such as optimal truncation points, to
downstream transcoders. However, SSS scheme does not con-
sider key management which is the major topic of this paper.
Wu et al. [16] proposed a progressive protection method for
JPEG 2000 code-streams. This progressive method is efficient
but is not satisfactory in flexibility. In order to provide compliant
encryption of a JPEG 2000 code-stream which has no emulation
marker in the protected packets, the packet body is repeatedly
encrypted with a standard stream cipher [17]. The advantage in
[17] is that the size of the protected code-stream is the same as
that of the original code-stream.
Recently, Zhu et al. [18] proposed a key management scheme
for protecting JPEG 2000 code-streams. They created a dia-
gram whose nodes are used to represent resolutions, layers,
precincts and tiles. Although their scheme is flexible in terms
of truncating, each JPEG 2000 packet has to piggyback at least
one node value whose length is identical to that of hash value.
Hence, their scheme is more suitable to protection of motion
JPEG 2000 stream than protection of JPEG 2000 code-stream.
B. Outline of the Paper
The paper is arranged as follows. Section II illustrates the
basic concepts and characteristics of JPEG 2000 image code-
streams. Section III introduces the access control system setup
and several security classes related to JPEG 2000 image code-
streams. Section IV presents a naïve access control scheme and
its analysis. Section V is the main contribution of the paper
where we describe our secure access control scheme. Section VI
shows our experiment results. Section VII contains some con-
cluding remarks.
C. Notations
We list below important notations used throughout the paper
for ease of reference. Terminology such as precinct, resolution,
resolution-increment, quality layer (or layer in short) and layer-
increment will become clear in the next section. We will refer
a JPEG 2000 image code-stream simply as JPEG 2000 code-
stream or just code-stream
number of components in a code-stream;
th component in a code-stream,
;
number of resolutions/resolution-increments in a
code-stream;
resolution-increment in a code-stream,
;
number of layers/layer-increments in a
code-stream;
layer-increment in a code-stream,
;
number of precincts in a resolution. W.l.o.g,
assume every resolution has the same number of
precincts;
th precinct in a resolution, ;
cryptographic one-way hash function;
concatenation of and .
II. OVERVIEW OF JPEG 2000 CODE-STREAMS
In what follows, we provide a brief description of the con-
cepts and terminology related to JPEG 2000 code-streams. Our
goal is to illuminate the main concepts at a sufficient level to
impart an understanding of our access control scheme without
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Fig. 1. n = 3 resolutions of an image. (a) 128  128; (b) 64  64; and (c)
32  32.
dwelling into too much on the details. Those interested in the
details are referred to [1]–[3].
A. Basic Concepts and Terminology
Tiles: JPEG 2000 divides an image into rectangular non-
overlapping regions known as tiles, which are compressed inde-
pendently, as though they were entirely distinct images. Tiling
reduces memory requirements during compression and decom-
pression. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of gener-
ality, we will only consider single tile code-streams.
Components: An image is comprised of one or more compo-
nents; each consists of a rectangular array of samples. For ex-
ample, a RGB color image has three components representing
the red, green and blue color planes.
Resolution-Increments and Resolutions: Given a tile-compo-
nent, a -level dyadic wavelet transform is performed.
The first wavelet transform decomposes a component into
four frequency subbands (horizontally lowpass and ver-
tically lowpass), (horizontally lowpass and vertically
highpass), (horizontally highpass and vertically lowpass)
and (horizontally highpass and vertically highpass).
The second wavelet transform further decomposes into
another four subbands , , , and . Finally,
the th wavelet transform decomposes into
four subbands , , , and .
Therefore, a -level dyadic wavelet transform gen-
erates sets of subbands, denoted as ,
. We refer to as resolution-incre-
ment of a code-stream. The resolution-increments above
correspond to image sizes or resolutions. The resolution
0 image is constructed from resolution-increment 0, ,
and is a small “thumbnail” of the original image. The reso-
lution 1 image is constructed from resolution-increments 0
and 1, , and is a bigger “thumbnail” of the original
image. In general, the resolution image is constructed from
resolution-increments 0 to , . Note that the
resolution image is the original image. Fig. 1 shows
resolutions of a code-stream. The original image is of
size 128 128, resolution 1 is of size 64 64, and the lowest
resolution 0 is of size 32 32.
Fig. 2. Two images of different qualities. Note: bpp (bit per pixel). (a) 0.05 bpp
and (b) 0.5 bpp.
Layer-Increments and Layers: Following the wavelet de-
composition, wavelet coefficients are quantized and each
quantized subband is partitioned into small rectangular blocks,
referred to as code-blocks. Each code-block is independently
entropy encoded to create a compressed bit-stream which is
distributed across quality layers. Layers determine the
quality or signal-to-noise ratio of the reconstructed image.
Roughly speaking, a higher quality image needs more bits for
each pixel representation than a lower quality image. Let
denote the code-stream data needed to form a layer 0 image.
Let be the additional code-stream data to form a layer
image given , . That is, a
layer image is formed from . Note that
the image of layer is the original image. We refer to
as layer-increment , . Fig. 2 illustrates
two images of different qualities.
Precincts: In order to provide locality for accessing certain
portions (e.g., WOI) of an image, an intermediate space-fre-
quency structure known as precinct is provided in JEPG2000.
Unlike the tile and code-block partitions, the precinct partition
does not affect the transformation or coding of sample data; it
instead plays an important role in organizing compressed data
within a code-stream. Specifically, a precinct is a collection of
spatially contiguous code-blocks from all subbands at a partic-
ular resolution. In Fig. 3(a), the original image of size 512
512 is divided into four precincts of size 256 256 each. In
Fig. 3(b), each smaller resolution includes four precincts with
one-to-one correspondence to the 4 precincts in Fig. 3(a). For
instance, the gray blocks marked , and form a precinct
in resolutions 2, 1, and 0, respectively, and they all correspond
to the gray precinct in Fig. 3(a). In other words, the data in
precincts , and can be used to reconstruct the gray re-
gion in the original image.
Packets: Packets are the fundamental building blocks
in a JPEG 2000 code-stream. It comprises the compressed
bit-stream from code-blocks belonging to a specific compo-
nent, resolution, layer, and precinct. Fig. 4 shows the process
for generating packets. The original image is first decomposed
into components. Then, the dyadic wavelet transform is applied
to each component to produce the subbands corresponding
to various resolution-increments. Each subband is quantized
and divided into code-blocks. Certain spatially contiguous
code-blocks in subbands of a resolution form a precinct.
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Fig. 3. Precinct partition. (a) Precincts of the original image and (b) precincts of lower resolutions.
Fig. 4. Packet generation process.
Each code-block is encoded independently into compressed
bit-stream which is distributed into quality layer increments.
Finally, compressed bits from the same component, resolu-
tion-increment, precinct and layer-increment are encapsulated
into a packet.
B. Progression Orders
Progressive display allows images to be reconstructed with
increasing pixel quality or resolution, as needed or desired, for
different target devices. JPEG 2000 supports progression in four
dimensions: quality layer, resolution, spatial location and com-
ponent [1]–[3].
• In quality layer progression, image quality is improved
when more layer-increments are received. For example, the
image with the lowest quality is reconstructed from de-
coding . The image with the next quality layer is ob-
tained by decoding and . Improving quality is then a
simple matter of decoding more bits.
• In resolution progression, the first few bytes, i.e., , is
used to form a small “thumbnail” of the image. As more
resolution-increments are received,
, image width and height double.
• In spatial location progression, image is displayed in ap-
proximately raster fashion, i.e., from left to right and from
top to down, or displayed by WOI.
TABLE I
ABSTRACT STRUCTURE OF A JPEG 2000 CODE-STREAM
Fig. 5. Arrangement of packets in a code-stream following progression order
LRCP, where D is a certain packet D in Table I.
• Component progression controls the order in which the
data corresponding to different components is decoded.
These dimensions of progression can be “mixed and
matched” within a single compressed code-stream and this
has been referred to as the “compress once, decompress many
ways” property of JPEG 2000 [1]. Table I shows a typical JPEG
2000 code-stream which consists of a header, data packets
arranged in a particular progression order,
and an end-of-code-stream marker EOC. Fig. 5 shows the
pseudo-code for generating a code-stream of progression order
LRCP (layer-resolution-component-precinct).
III. OVERVIEW OF THE ACCESS CONTROL SCHEMES
Before proceeding to the presentation of our access control
schemes, we first describe the system setup and operation, secu-
rity classes related to JEPG2000 code-streams and access con-
trol rules.
A. System Setup and Operation
Part 9 of the JEPG 2000 standard, JPEG 2000 Interactive Pro-
tocol (JPIP) [19] specifies how to respond to user requests of im-
ages with various progression orders. JPIP is mainly intended
for interactive on-line client/server type of applications. Pro-
tected with access control, JPIP can also be adapted for non-in-
teractive as well as off-line distributions. The system setup for
access control to JPEG 2000 code-streams is shown in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Access control system setup and operation.
High level operation of the system consists of the following
three steps.
1) JPEG 2000 code-streams are first encrypted by the pub-
lisher and then distributed to users. Since the code-streams
are protected by encryption, all conceivable ways of con-
tent data distribution can now be enabled, including for ex-
amples Internet, digital cable TV, satellite broadcast and
CD-ROM publishing. This concept, called “super-distribu-
tion” [20], provides the publisher a very flexible way to use
the most appropriate distribution channel.
2) The control data, i.e., keys for decrypting the content data,
is forwarded securely from the publisher to an on-line key
server.
3) A user who desires to access portions of a code-stream
sends his/her request together with authentication informa-
tion or payment data to the key server. The key server, in
turn, responds with appropriate decryption keys according
to user’s privilege or amount of payment.
B. Security Classes and Access Control Rules
From Section II-A, a code-stream can be reviewed as a
collection of bitstreams generated from components
, precincts ,
resolution-increments , and
layer-increments . We note that
components are introduced in JPEG 2000 mainly for improving
compression efficiency and for progressive display of images
when data is sent over slow channels; they are not very mean-
ingful as far as access control is concerned. Hence, we will
not address access control to components during the rest of
the paper. In other words, we assume that all components are
accessed at the same security level. It should be noted that our
access control schemes can be easily extended to enforce access
control to components whenever it is needed. Consider the
situation where users and data can be classified into a hierarchy
of security classes [21]. If a security class is the predecessor
of another security class , we say that strictly dominates
and denote this relation as . Similarly, we say that
dominates , denoted as , if either or . We
say that and are comparable if or ; otherwise
and are incomparable. From the progression properties of
code-streams presented in Section II-B, we define the following
security classes related to a JPEG 2000 code-stream:
• The security classes of resolution-increments ,
, are total ordering [21], with
(1)
• The security classes of layer-increments ,
, are total ordering, with
(2)
• The security classes of the precincts ,
, are isolated classes [21]. That is, and are incom-
parable for all .
Based on the above security classes, our aim is to enforce the
following access control rules for a JPEG 2000 code-stream.
• A user who is allowed to access security class also have
access to for all but not to for all .
• A user who is allowed to access security class can also
access for all but not for all .
• A user who is allowed to access a subset of
can not have access to any other sub-
sets outside of the granted subset.
• Any “mix and match” of the above regardless of the pro-
gression order of the code-stream.
In order to realize access control to JPEG 2000 code-streams
which meets our access control rules above, it is natural to
form a combined hierarchy of security classes from the isolated
precinct security classes, the total ordered resolution-increment
security classes and layer-increment security classes. Unfortu-
nately, the resulting hierarchy of security classes is a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG), not a rooted tree. There are crypto-
graphic solutions available in the literature for key generation
and implementing access controls in DAGs (see for examples
[8]–[12], [22]). All of them, however, are based on public key
cryptosystems and are extremely complex and computationally
expensive for our applications.
IV. A NAIVE ACCESS CONTROL SCHEMES
In this section we present a simple-minded approach to re-
alize access control to JPEG 2000 code-streams. Our objective
here is twofold. The first is to illustrate the essence of the access
control problem and the second is to show some pitfalls a robust
design must avoid.
A. Packet Key Generation and Code-Stream Encryption
Fig. 7 illustrates how to generate precinct, resolution and
layer keys from a master key, combine them to produce
packet keys, and then use packet keys to encrypt packets in a
code-stream. Specifically, we have the following.
• Given a code-stream, generate a random master key
which is then diversified into resolution keys, layer keys
and precinct keys as below.
• Generate resolution keys iteratively from the hash chain
(3)
for , where
and where “ ” denotes the ASCII code of the
letter .
• Generate layer keys iteratively from the hash chain
(4)
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Fig. 7. Packet key generation for the second scheme.
for , , where
and where “ ” denotes the ASCII code of the
letter .
• Generate precinct keys from
(5)
for , where “ ” denotes the
ASCII code of the letter .
• Combine keys to generate the packet key
(6)
and encrypt packet using for
, , and .
B. Access Encrypted Code-Stream
Assume that a user sends a request to the key server in Fig. 6
asking for the right to access an image with resolution , layer
and precincts , . The key server
replies with the resolution key , the layer key , and
the precinct keys , . To access packets
associated with the requested image, the user proceeds as fol-
lows.
• Compute, from , resolution keys
, iteratively
using (3).
• Compute, from , layer keys
, iteratively using
(4).
• Compute, from the resolution keys, layer keys, and
precinct keys, packet key using (6), and then decrypt
packet , for ; ; and
.
C. Discussion
First, we note that this scheme is flexible. It allows a user
to access images with any resolution, layer and precinct com-
bination, as long as the user possessing the required privilege
or having made sufficient payment. Second, it is quite efficient.
For a user to request access to an image with resolution , layer
and precincts, the key server transfers only keys,
1 resolution key, 1 layer key and precinct keys. Third, given
the keys, the user is not able to access images with res-
olutions higher than or with layers higher than . This is be-
cause, given the resolution key , it is infeasible to compute
the resolution key for any due to the one-wayness of
the hash function . Similarly, given the layer key , it is
infeasible to compute the layer key for any . Unfortu-
nately, this scheme is subject to the following collusion attack.
Assume that a user first pays to access an image of resolution
and layer . In this case, the key server replies with keys
and . The user then pays to access another image from
the same code-stream with resolution and layer . The key
server this time supplies the user with keys and . Then
without further payment, the user is able to access the image
with resolution and layer .
The proof of this fact is straightforward using (3), (4) and (6)
and hence is omitted here. As an extreme case of this attack, a
user just needs to purchase two images, one with the smallest
resolution but the highest quality layer, and the other with the
full resolution but the lowest quality layer, then the user can ac-
quire the original image (i.e., the image with full resolution and
the highest quality) for free. This is clearly unacceptable to most
applications. Our access control scheme given in the next sec-
tion is secure against this type of collusion attacks.
V. SECURE ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME
Sandhu [5] introduces a cryptographic implementation for ac-
cess control in a situation where users and information items are
classified into a rooted tree of security classes, with the most
privileged security class at the root. The idea is that keys for
security classes are generated from their parent class using a
parameterized family of one-way functions. In this section, we
seek to adapt Sandhu’s approach to arrive at a flexible, efficient
and secure access control scheme for JPEG 2000 code-streams.
A. Sandhu’s Key Generation Scheme
In Sandu’s scheme, encryption keys associated with a tree of
security classes are generated as follows.
1) For the security class at the root assign an arbitrary key.
2) If a security class is an immediate child of in the tree,
let , where and are the keys
associated with and , respectively, and is the
name of .
The keys and are used to encrypt information items of
security classes and , respectively. A user at a security
level, say , needs to know . Since one-way hash function
is public, keys for security classes dominated by can be gen-
erated from as needed. However, it is computationally in-
feasible to compute keys for any predecessors or any siblings
of due to the one-way nature of the hash function. We show
the construction and application of Sandhu trees with a simple
example. Consider the security classes , , , , , ,
and , where and ; and ;
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Fig. 8. Example Sandhu tree.
and and . The Sandhu tree for this security
class hierarchy is given in Fig. 8.
We assign a random key to the root. The keys for
and are and
, respectively. The keys for , , , and
are , ,
and ,
respectively. A user with security clearance is given .
He can easily compute keys for and , but not for any
other nodes in the tree. It is interesting to note that Sandhu
tree is, in certain sense, the opposite of Merkle tree [24]. The
former is used for access control while the latter is used for
authentication.
B. Tree-Based Scheme
Recall the three hierarchies of security classes defined in
[1]–[3]—the total ordering security classes of resolution-incre-
ments, the total ordering security classes of layer-increments
and the isolated classes of precincts. Using the techniques in
[21], we can obtain the overall composite hierarchy for a JPEG
2000 code-stream by combining the three simpler hierarchies.
As mentioned before, the resulting hierarchy is a DAG and
therefore is not amenable to efficient solutions.
Sandhu tree is an efficient, scalable and flexible method of
generating cryptographic keys for tree hierarchies, not for DAGs
in general. Our challenge here is to bring the advantages of
Sandhu tree to the access control of JPEG 2000 code-streams.
The key in meeting this challenge is to construct a rooted tree
of security classes for JPEG 2000 code-steams. It turns out that
this can be done in a systematic way. The trick is to specify a
preferred progression order when constructing the overall hier-
archy for a JPEG 2000 code-stream.
We use an example to illustrate our idea. Assume that the pre-
ferred progression order is resolution-layer-precinct. The rooted
tree hierarchy for a JPEG 2000 code-stream is shown in Fig. 9.
Observe how the tree is constructed based on the preferred pro-
gression order resolution-layer-precinct: the resolution-incre-
ments form the trunk of the tree, the layer-increments form the
branches and finally the precincts form the leaves. Also ob-
serve that the tree preserves the hierarchies of individual se-
curity classes, e.g., the trunk formed from the resolution-incre-
ments is still a total ordering.
We remark that there are a number of subtle differences be-
tween our tree and a Sandhu tree. First, a given class, say ,
is assigned to multiple nodes in our tree while this is not al-
lowed in a Sandhu tree. Second, keys associated with non-leaf
nodes in a Sandhu tree are used for encrypting information items
Fig. 9. Rooted tree for a code-stream with progression order resolution-layer-
precinct.
associated with the nodes, while in our tree only keys associ-
ated with the leaf-nodes will be used to encrypt packets in the
code-stream.
1) Packet Key Generation and Code-Stream Encryption: Key
generation in our rooted tree follows the same approach as that
in the Sandhu tree.
• Given a code-stream, generate a random master key .
• Generate keys for the resolution nodes iteratively from the
hash chain
(7)
for , , where
and where “ ” denotes the ASCII code of the
letter .
• For a given , generate keys for the layer nodes iteratively
from the hash chain
(8)
for , , ,
, where and where “ ”
denotes the ASCII code of the letter .
• For a given and , generate keys for the precinct nodes
from
(9)
for , , ,
and , where “ ”
denotes the ASCII code of the letter .
• Encrypt the packet using the key under a
symmetric key algorithm for ,
, and .
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Fig. 10. An example rooted tree for a code-stream with n = 3, n = 3, and
n = 2 and preferred progression order resolution-layer-precinct.
2) Access Encrypted Code-Stream: There are three cases to
consider here depending on the user access requirements.
Case 1) A user requests access to the image of resolution
(i.e., the image of resolution with the highest
quality layer and all the precincts). The key server in
Fig. 6 replies with . To obtain the packets corre-
sponding to the requested image, the user proceeds
as follows.
(I) Compute, from , keys
, iteratively
using (7).
(II) Compute, from the keys obtained in step
(I), keys , iteratively using (8), for
and .
(III) Compute, from the keys obtained in step
(II), the packet key using (9), and
then decrypt the packet , for
; and
.
Case 2) A user requests access to the image of resolu-
tion and layer (and with all the precincts).
The key server supplies the user with keys ,
. The user then computes all the
necessary packet keys using (8) and (9).
Case 3) A user desires access to the image of resolu-
tion , layer and precincts ,
. The key server replies with
the keys for ,
and . The user simply uses these
keys to decrypt the corresponding packets in order
to obtain the desired image.
Fig. 10 depicts an example rooted tree for a code-stream with
, , and . The key associated with each
node is shown in the parentheses next to the node. To access the
image with resolution 1, a user only needs to know ; to access
the image with resolution 1 and layer 1, the user needs to know
and ; to access the image with resolution 1, layer 1 and
precinct 0, the user needs to know keys , , , and
.
3) Discussion: This scheme allows privileged users to ac-
cess images with any resolution, layer and precinct as well as
their combinations; therefore, it is very flexible and maintains
the “compress once, decompress many ways” merit of the JPEG
2000 standard. The collusion attack to the second scheme shown
in Section IV is due to the key combining operation in (6), but
the scheme in this section is protected from the collusion at-
tack since its key generation process is strictly sequential and
is free from the combining operation as in the second scheme.
The overhead for key transmission from the key server to a user
depends on the type of images requested and on the way the
rooted tree is constructed. For the tree in Fig. 9, to access the
image with resolution , only one key is required; to ac-
cess the image with resolution and layer , keys,
, , need to be sent to the user; however,
to access the image of resolution , layer and precincts
, , the key server has to transmit
keys, for , , and
to the user. Therefore, the tree in Fig. 9 is
the most efficient in accommodating resolution requests and the
least efficient for handling precinct requests.
In general, we can easily adapt our rooted tree construction
according to user request patterns. For example, assume that
most of the user requests are precinct requests, followed by res-
olution requests and then followed by layer requests, our tree
should be constructed based on the preferred progression order
precinct-resolution-layer. The resulting tree, shown in Fig. 11,
is the most efficient for precinct requests but the least efficient
for layer requests. To access an image with precincts (i.e., an
image with precincts, full resolution and the highest layer),
only keys are needed. In practical applications, users are nor-
mally not interested in individual precincts, but rather on WOI
of a code-stream. For such applications, we can modify our
key generation process by assigning one key to precincts cor-
responding to the WOI and another to all the precincts outside
of the WOI. This reduces the number of keys for precincts to
just two regardless of the number of precincts in a code-stream.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We have implemented our third scheme presented in
Section V-B for access control to JPEG 2000 code-streams
in C++. The demo has been shown in the ISO/IEC JPSEC
meeting. The software comprises three modules, a publisher
module, a key server module and a user module. The publisher
module accepts a JPEG 2000 code-stream. Note that informa-
tion such as , , and the preferred progression order
of the code-stream are contained in the code-stream header.
The publisher module first constructs a rooted-tree based on
the preferred progression order of the code-stream, assigns a
random master key to the root, computes packet keys and
encrypts all the packets in the code-stream according to the
process given in Section V-B. We use RC4 [25] to encrypt
packets since stream cipher RC4 requires no padding in packet
encryption. The publisher module deposits the encrypted
code-stream along with its file name, , into a public
directory, and forwards to the key
server module over a secure channel. The user module fetches
the encrypted code-stream from the public directory and inter-
acts with the key server to obtain appropriate decryption keys.
The user module allows a user to request for any resolution,
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Fig. 11. Rooted tree for a code-stream with preferred progression order
precinct-resolution-layer.
Fig. 12. Original “Lenna” image, with n = 4, n = 8, and n = 16.
layer, precinct and any combinations of the above. A JPEG
2000 code-stream for the source image “Lenna” shown Fig. 12
is used as our test example. The “Lenna” code-stream has
, and with the preferred progression
order resolution-layer-precinct. We divide the 16 precincts into
two groups, with the center 4 precincts as the WOI and the rest
12 precincts as the “Boarder Region.” For a given resolution
and layer, packets in the WOI are encrypted using a single
key and packets in the “Boarder Region” are encrypted using
another key. This approach to encrypting precincts has two
advantages. First, it is practical and intuitive for user access
since users normally are not interested in randomly selected
precincts, but in either WOI or the entire image; second, it also
greatly reduces the number of keys.
Fig. 13. Results of the first experiment. (a) Granted image, (b) extrapolated
image (PSNR = 27:9 dB), and (c) the reference image (resolution 2).
Referring to Fig. 9 and the key generation process in
Section V-B, all the keys generated for this code-stream are
given in Table II below. Note that there are only two packet
encrypt keys for a given resolution-increment and layer-in-
crement . For example, for and , the two packet
keys are and , one for encrypting packets in the WOI
and the other for packets in the “Boarder Region.”
In our first experiment, we assume that a user purchases the
image at resolution 1. The user obtains key and gets the image
shown in Fig. 13(a). Since the user is not able to derive ,
for , she/he is not able to decrypt packets corresponding
to higher resolutions. However, the user may still try to con-
struct images of higher resolutions by extrapolating the granted
image with encrypted packets corresponding to higher resolu-
tions. Fig. 13(b) shows the extrapolated image of resolution 2.
To quantitatively describe the quality degradation of the extrap-
olated images, we adopt the traditional definition of the PSNR
(peak signal-noise-ratio) between a reference image and an in-
spected image , both of size , as
(10)
(11)
Generally speaking, if [1], an image is re-
garded as visually acceptable. Using the image in Fig. 13(c)
(resolution 2 and the highest layer) as the reference, the PSNR
of the image in Fig. 13(b) is 27.9 dB given that the undecrypted
bitstream is used directly. Obviously, the extrapolated image is
of unacceptable quality.
In the next experiment, we assume that the user requests the
image with resolution 2 and layer 4. Accordingly, the key server
supplies the user with keys , , and . The image granted
access is given in Fig. 14(a). Failing to obtain packets for layers
higher than 4, the user tries to get an image at layer 7 by ex-
trapolating the granted image with the encrypted higher layer
packets. The resulting image is shown in Fig. 14(b), which ends
up has a much lower quality than the granted image.
Our third experiment is related to access to WOI. Here the
user requests to access the WOI (i.e., the 4 center precincts) with
resolution 3 and layer 4. In response, the key server supplies
the user with keys , , 1, 2, 3 and ,1, 2, 3, 4.
The granted WOI is shown in Fig. 15(a) while the extrapolated
image is shown in Fig. 15(b).
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TABLE II
KEYS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ROOTED TREE FOR THE “LENNA” CODE-STREAM
Fig. 14. Results of the second experiment (using the image in Fig. 13(c) as the
reference). (a) Granted image (PSNR = 54 dB) and (b) extrapolated image
(PSNR = 41:5 dB).
Fig. 15. Results of the third experiment. (a) Granted WOI and (b) extrapolated
image.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the state-of-the-art wavelet technology, the JPEG
2000 is an emerging international standard for image compres-
sion. Part 8 of the JPEG 2000 standard is concerned with JPEG
2000 code-stream security with particular emphasis on flexible
access control and authentication.
Our access control scheme for JPEG 2000 code-streams uses
hash functions and rooted trees for systematic key generation
and packet encryption. Since code-streams are protected by
encryption, all conceivable ways of content distribution, such
as broadcast and CD-ROM publishing, can be used. A user who
desires to access any part of the code-stream interacts with a
key server for authentication and key acquisition. The scheme
is secure and efficient, and very importantly, flexible. That is,
our scheme allows access control to JPEG 2000 code-streams
according to any combination of resolution, quality layer and
window-of-interest. From this point of review, our scheme
is designed for “encrypt once, decrypt many ways,” which
matches perfectly with the “compress once, decompress many
ways” property of the JPEG 2000 code-streams. We have
implemented our access control scheme in a prototype which
demonstrated the practical feasibility and compatibility of
the proposed scheme with JPEG 2000 standard Part 1. The
proposed scheme has been incorporated into the JPSEC [4].
REFERENCES
[1] D. S. Taubman and M. W. Marcellin, JPEG 2000 Image Compression
Fundamentals, Standard and Practice. Norwell, MA: Kluwer, 2000.
[2] M. Rabbani and R. Joshi, “An overview of the JPEG 2000 still image
compression standard,” Signal Process.: Image Commun., vol. 17, pp.
3–48, 2002.
[3] ITU-T Rec. T.800, ISO 154447 [Online]. Available: http://www.
jpeg.org
[4] Information technology—JPEG 2000 image coding system-Part 8: Se-
cure JPEG 2000, ISO/IEC 15444-8, Apr. 2007.
[5] R. S. Sandhu, “Cryptographic implementation of a tree hierarchy for
access control,” Inform. Process. Lett., vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 95–98, 1988.
[6] E. Bertino, S. Jajodia, and P. Samarati, “Access controls in object-ori-
ented database systems—Some approaches and issues,” Adv. Database
Syst., vol. 759, pp. 17–44, 1993.
[7] R. S. Sandhu and P. Samarati, “Access control: Principle and practice,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 32, no. 9, pp. 40–48, 1994.
[8] S. G. Akl and P. D. Taylor, “Cryptographic solution to a problem of
access control in a hierarchy,” ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., vol. 1, no. 3,
pp. 239–248, 1983.
[9] G. C. Chick and S. E. Tavares, “Flexible access control with master
keys,” in Proc. Advances in Cryptology-Crypto’89, 1990, vol. 435,
LNCS, pp. 316–322.
1324 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MULTIMEDIA, VOL. 9, NO. 6, OCTOBER 2007
[10] L. Harn and H. Y. Lin, “A cryptographic key generation scheme for
multi-level data security,” J. Comput. Secur., vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 539–546,
1990.
[11] S. J. MacKinnon, P. D. Taylor, H. Meijer, and S. G. Akl, “An optimal
algorithm for assigning cryptographic keys to access control in a hier-
archy,” IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. C-34, no. 9, pp. 797–802, 1985.
[12] K. Ohta, T. Okamoto, and K. Koyama, “Membership authentication
for hierarchical multigroup using the extended Fiat-Shamir scheme,”
in Proc. Advances in Cryptology-Eurpcrypt’90, 1991, vol. 473, pp.
316–322.
[13] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining
digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems,” Commun. ACM, vol.
21, no. 2, pp. 637–647, 1978.
[14] R. Grosbois, P. Gerbelot, and T. Ebrahimi, “Authentication and access
control in the JPEG 2000 compression domain,” in Proc. SPIE 46th
Annu. Meeting: Applications of Digital Image Processing XXIV, 2001,
vol. 4472, pp. 95–104.
[15] S. Wee and J. Apostolopoulos, “Secure scalable streaming and secure
transcoding with JPEG-2000,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Image Process.,
2003, vol. 1, pp. 14–17.
[16] Y. Wu, D. Ma, and R. H. Deng, “Progressive protection of JPEG 2000
code-streams,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Image Processing, 2004, pp.
3439–3442.
[17] Y. Wu and R. H. Deng, “Compliant encryption of JPEG 2000 code-
streams,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Image Processing, 2004, pp.
3447–3450.
[18] B. B. Zhu, Y. Yang, and S. Li, “An efficient key scheme for multiple
access of JPEG 2000 and motion JPEG 2000 enabling truncations,” in
Proc. IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference
(CCNC), Jan. 2006, vol. 2, pp. 1124–1128.
[19] ISO/IEC FDIS 15444-9: Information Technology—JPEG 2000 Image
Coding System—Part 9: Interactivity Tools, APIs and Protocols Jul. 1,
2004.
[20] R. Mori and M. Kawahara, “Superdistribution: The concept and the
architecture,” Trans. IEIEC vol. E73, no. 7, Jul. 1990 [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.virtualschool.edu/mon/ElectronicProperty/MoriSu-
perdist.html
[21] R. S. Sandhu, “Lattice-based access control models,” IEEE Computer,
vol. 26, no. 11, pp. 9–19, 1993.
[22] I. Ray, I. Ray, and N. Narasimhamurthi, “A cryptographic solution to
implement access control in a hierarchy and more,” in Proc. 7th ACM
Symp. Access Control Models and Technologies, 2002, pp. 65–73.
[23] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard
(SHS) FIPS Publ. 180-1, 1995.
[24] R. C. Merkle, “A certified digital signature,” in Proc. Advances in Cryp-
tology-Crypto ’89, 1989, vol. 435, pp. 218–238.
[25] R. L. Rivest, RC4 Encryption Algorithm RSA Data Security, Inc., Mar.
12, 1992.
Yongdong Wu received the B.A and M.S. degrees
in automation control from Beijing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing, China, in
1991 and 1994, respectively, and the Ph.D. degree
in pattern recognition and intelligent control from
the Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of
Science, in 1997.
He is currently a Principal Investigator with
the Infocomm Security Department, Institute of
Infocomm Research, Singapore. His interests in-
cludes multimedia security, e-business, digital right
management, and network security. He has five patents and 60 technical
publications in international conferences and journals.
Dr. Wu won the Tan Kah Kee Young Inventor Award in 2004 and 2005.
Di Ma received the B. Eng. degree in computer
science and engineering and the M. Eng degree in
electrical engineering from Xi’an Jiaotong Univer-
sity, China, in 1995 and 1998, respectively. She
received her second M. Eng degree in computer
science from Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore, in 2000. She is currently pursuing the a
Ph.D. degree at the University of California, Irvine.
She was a Senior Research Engineer with the Info-
comm Security Department, Institute for Infocomm
Research, Singapore. Her research interests include
applied cryptography and security in multimedia, networks, and databases. She
has 15 technical publications in international conferences and journals.
Ms. Ma was the recipient of Tan Kah Kee Young Investigator Award in 2004.
Robert H. Deng received the B.S. degree from the
National University of Defense Technology, China,
and the M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees from the Illinois In-
stitute of Technology, Chicago.
He has been with Singapore Management Univer-
sity since 2004, and is currently Professor, Associate
Dean for Faculty and Research, and Director of the
SIS Research Center, School of Information Systems.
Prior to this, he was Principal Scientist and Manager
of the Infocomm Security Department, Institute for
Infocomm Research. He has 26 patents and more than
150 technical publications in international conferences and journals in the areas
of computer networks, network security, and information security.
Dr. Deng has served as general chair, program committee chair, and member
of numerous international conferences. He received the University Outstanding
Researcher Award from the National University of Singapore in 1999 and the
Lee Kuan Yew Fellow for Research Excellence from the Singapore Management
University in 2006.
